This post was originally published on Security Affairs. It can be found here.
France blames Russia-linked APT28 for cyberattacks targeting or compromising a dozen French government bodies and other entities.
The Russia-linked APT28 group has targeted or compromised a dozen government organizations and other French entities, the French Government states. In 2024, it was observed attacking OT organizations and linked to cyberattacks on 60 entities in Asia and Europe.
Since 2021, APT28 has targeted or compromised French ministerial bodies, local governments, DTIB, aerospace, research, think-tanks, and financial entities. In 2024, attacks primarily focused on governmental, diplomatic, and research sectors, with some campaigns specifically hitting French government organizations.
The APT28 group (aka Fancy Bear, Pawn Storm, Sofacy Group, Sednit, BlueDelta, and STRONTIUM) has been active since at least 2007 and it has targeted governments, militaries, and security organizations worldwide. The group was involved also in the string of attacks that targeted 2016 Presidential election.
The group operates out of military unity 26165 of the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS).
France’s ANSSI linked 2024 cyberattacks on government, diplomatic, research, aerospace, and financial sectors—including think tanks—to APT28.
On Tuesday, the French cybersecurity agency ANSSI published a report linking attacks on local government, diplomatic, research, and financial organizations, as well as think tanks, to the cyber espionage group APT28.
“Drawing on public reports, infrastructure analyses and elements collected and analysed during incident response, the investigations conducted by ANSSI and its Cyber Crisis Coordination Centre (C4) partners led to the identification of several infection chains associated with the APT28 intrusion set and used for espionage purposes. C4 members are monitoring the evolution of the intrusion set’s techniques, tactics and procedures (TTP), which have been adapted to new contexts without having been entirely renewed.” reads ANSSI’s report. “The analyses of the TTPs used during APT28 campaigns since 2021 and the recommendations published in October of 2023 remain relevant and may be consulted on the website of the CERT-FR”
APT28’s attack chain begins with phishing and brute-force attacks, along with zero-day exploitation (e.g. CVE-2023-23397). They often target poorly monitored edge devices to avoid detection. Some campaigns aim for immediate espionage, stealing conversations, credentials, and address books, without establishing long-term system access.
“Fromthe reconnaissance phase to the exfiltration of data, operators of the APT28 intrusion set heavily rely on low-cost and ready-to-use outsourced infrastructure. Such infrastructure may be made up of rented servers, free hosting services, VPN services, and temporary e-mail address creation services. The use of such services provides greater flexibility in the creation and administration of new resources, and enhances stealth.” continues the report. “Indeed, a number of these services are also legitimately used by individuals and enterprises– which further complexifies the detection and monitoring of such infrastructure by security teams.”
The Russian cyberspies have repeatedly targeted Roundcube email servers using phishing to deploy exploit kits and exfiltrate data. In 2023, they used free web services like InfinityFree and Mocky.IO to deliver ZIP files with the HeadLace backdoor, steal credentials, and deploy tools. They also updated the OceanMap stealer to exfiltrate browser credentials and ran phishing campaigns to steal Yahoo and UKR.NET login info using fake pages and dynamic DNS to hide infrastructure.
“France condemns in the strongest terms the use by Russia’s military intelligence service (GRU) of the APT28 attack group, at the origin of several cyber attacks on French interests.” reads a statement published by France’s Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. “Since 2021, this attack group has been used to target or compromise a dozen French entities. These entities are working in the daily lives of French people and include public services, private enterprises as well as a sport organization involved in the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games. “
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Pierluigi Paganini
(SecurityAffairs – hacking, ANSSI)
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